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Religious Liberties
Why the Supreme Court Has Fashioned Rules of Standing 
Unique to the Establishment Clause
By Carl H. Esbeck*
The U.S. Supreme Court is quite vigilant in enforcing its justiciability rules concerning standing to sue. For over half a century, however, the Supreme Court has 
reduced the rigor of its standing rules when a claim is lodged 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Th e Court famously did so with respect to federal taxpayer 
standing in the venerable case of Flast v. Cohen,1 but in no 
instance other than claims invoking the Establishment Clause 
is federal or state taxpayer standing ever permitted.2 Less well 
known is the reduced rigor with which the Court has applied 
its standing rules when it comes to a plaintiﬀ ’s “unwanted 
exposure” to a religious symbol or other speech attributable to 
the government.
Th e Roberts Court narrowly construed its prior cases 
permitting taxpayer standing to challenge government payments 
for religious purposes in Hein v. Freedom From Religion 
Foundation, Inc.3 Recently the Court granted certiorari in 
Salazar v. Buono,4 a case which raises the question of the standing 
required of a plaintiﬀ  in an “unwanted exposure” lawsuit that 
seeks the removal of a Latin cross on federal property because 
it is alleged to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Th e Supreme Court’s cases on “unwanted exposure” do 
not require religious coercion or other individualized harm as 
plaintiﬀ ’s “injury in fact.” Rather, the cases evince a willingness 
to ﬁ nd standing when a plaintiﬀ ’s status naturally results in him 
or her being personally exposed to the government’s unwanted 
religious expression or the plaintiﬀ  is forced to assume a special 
burden to avoid such exposure. Th e plaintiﬀ  in Salazar v. Buono 
lacks that status and, hence, will not likely be found to have 
standing unless the Court extends its precedents.
 I. Statement of the Case
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a Latin 
cross on a location known as Sunrise Rock in the Mojave 
Desert in southeastern California.5 Th is was unauthorized by 
the federal government, which owned the property. Th e cross is 
a memorial to members of the armed forces who died in World 
War I. In 1994, the site where the cross is located became part 
of the Mojave National Preserve, which is administered by the 
National Park Service, Department of the Interior. Th e Mojave 
National Preserve consists of 1.6 million acres of federal land 
in the Mojave Desert of southeastern California. 
Th e respondent, Frank Buono, ﬁ led this lawsuit in March 
2001, seeking a declaration that the Latin cross on government 
land violated the Establishment Clause, as well as an injunction 
ordering the permanent removal of the cross. At the time suit 
was ﬁ led, Buono was a retired employee of the National Park 
Service residing in Oregon. He retired twelve years ago in 
1997. When Buono was still employed by the Park Service, he 
was assigned to the Mojave Preserve from January 22, 1995 
to December 10, 1995. It was during this period that Buono 
learned of the Latin cross and visited the site at Sunrise Rock. 
Buono ﬁ rst became troubled when there was a request to 
erect a Buddhist stupa6 near the cross. When the request was 
denied, Buono believed it was wrong for the cross to remain 
while similar access was denied for the stupa. His objections 
later evolved and expanded. Although retired, Buono retains 
an active interest in the Mojave National Preserve and visits the 
Preserve two to four times per year. 
Buono is a Roman Catholic and testiﬁ ed that he does not 
ﬁ nd a Latin cross religiously oﬀ ensive. Rather, he is oﬀ ended 
because the cross remains at Sunrise Rock but similar access 
is denied to displays such as the Buddhist stupa, and because 
the National Park Service fails to remove the cross, a symbol of 
Christianity, from government land. When visiting the Mojave 
National Preserve, Buono has taken to avoiding Sunrise Rock 
so as not to be re-exposed to the cross, such avoidance being an 
added burden because it means not using Cima Road. One can 
see the Latin cross from the highway where Cima Road passes 
by Sunrise Rock. Cima Road is the most convenient road for 
accessing other areas of interest within the Preserve.
Th e Supreme Court has developed a three-part requirement 
for standing to sue. Th e plaintiﬀ  must have suﬀ ered, or is 
immediately threatened with, a speciﬁ c “injury in fact.” Th ere 
must be a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and 
plaintiﬀ ’s injury. And the plaintiﬀ  seeks a remedy of a type 
traditionally rendered by our courts of law or equity.  
Th e lower federal courts held that Buono has personalized 
“injury in fact” such that he has standing to bring this claim 
alleging a continuing violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Th e federal district court wrote as follows:
Buono is deeply oﬀ ended by the cross display on public land in 
an area that is not open to others to put up whatever symbols 
they choose. A practicing Roman Catholic, Buono does not ﬁ nd 
the cross itself objectionable, but stated that the presence of the 
cross is objectionable to him as a religious symbol because it rests 
on federal land.7  
First quoting with approval this passage by the district court, 
as well as taking note of Buono’s avoidance of Cima Road, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went on to observe that: 
Buono is, in other words, unable to “freely us[e]” the area of 
the Preserve around the cross because of the government’s 
allegedly unconstitutional actions…. We have repeatedly held 
that inability to unreservedly use public land suﬃ  ces as injury-
in-fact.... Such inhibition constitutes “personal injury suﬀ ered... 
as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,” beyond 
simply “the psychological consequence presumably produced by 
observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”8* Carl H. Esbeck is the R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. 
Lyda Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
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Given Buono’s testimony that as a Catholic he suﬀ ers no 
religious oﬀ ense because of the cross, spiritual injury cannot 
be a basis for “unwanted exposure” standing. Th at leaves two 
other possibilities: (1) oﬀ ense because others cannot erect their 
symbols near where the cross is located; or (2) oﬀ ense that the 
cross, a Christian symbol, stands on government property in 
violation of the separation of church and state. From the Ninth 
Circuit’s statement quoted above, the circuit court—while 
noting both oﬀ ensives as Buono’s claimed “injury in fact”—is 
relying principally on Buono’s “unwanted exposure” to the 
continued presence of a Latin cross on government property. 
Moreover, notes the circuit panel, Buono found this oﬀ ense 
suﬃ  ciently weighty that he has taken to avoiding Cima Road 
and thereby incurring additional travel burdens as he explores 
the Mojave National Preserve. 
Buono lacks third-party standing to complain that others 
are denied access to Sunrise Rock so that they might erect their 
own symbols.9 Th us, Buono’s oﬀ ense that others are denied 
their rights is a claim of “injury in fact” for the Buddhists who 
sought to erect a stupa some years back.10
Th e plaintiﬀ ’s other claim of “injury in fact” is a bit more 
involved. Buono seeks only injunctive relief from an ongoing 
injury. He does not seek damages. Th at leaves Buono’s alleged 
ongoing “injury in fact” as being either: (1) unwanted exposure 
to the cross because of the government’s failure to meet its duty 
of church-state separation which requires, in his view, removal 
of the cross from government land; or (2) restricted use of Cima 
Road to avoid being re-exposed every time he observes the 
government’s failure to remove the cross. Th e ﬁ rst allegation, 
however, is a claim of “injury in fact” when a strict separationist 
is oﬀ ended by a church-state violation while observing a 
religious symbol on government land. Th at is like the claimed 
“injury” discussed and rejected in Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United.11 And the second allegation of “injury in 
fact” is one of restricted use of Cima Road because of Buono’s 
oﬀ ense that the government has failed to remove the cross. Th us 
the second alleged harm (avoiding oﬀ ense) logically collapses 
into the ﬁ rst (being oﬀ ended). 
With respect to the alleged church-state violation observed 
by Respondents, Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., et al., the Valley Forge Court held:
Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been 
violated, they claim nothing else. Th ey fail to identify any 
personal injury suﬀ ered by them as a consequence of the alleged 
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees.... It is evident that respondents are ﬁ rmly committed to 
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but 
standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest 
or the fervor of his advocacy.12  
Buono tries to circumvent this passage in Valley Forge by 
asserting he suﬀ ers a personal injury in that he does not use 
Cima Road to avoid re-exposure to the Latin cross.
Th at is not enough for Buono to secure standing, as the 
Valley Forge Court went on to explain. Th e Court distinguished 
the facts before it in Valley Forge from that of the parents and 
school-age children exposed to unwanted prayer and devotional 
Bible reading in Abington School District v. Schempp:13 
“Th e parties [in Schempp] are school children and their parents, 
who are directly aﬀ ected by the laws and practices against which 
their complaints are directed.” ... Th e plaintiﬀ s in Schempp had 
standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment 
Clause—for as Doremus [v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 
429 (1952),] demonstrated, that is insuﬃ  cient—but because 
impressionable schoolchildren were subject to unwelcome 
religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens 
to avoid them. [Americans United, et al.] have alleged no 
comparable injury.14
Th e Supreme Court’s “unwanted exposure” precedents require 
that a plaintiﬀ ’s status naturally result in being personally 
exposed to oﬀ ensive religious expression by the government 
or forced to assume special burdens to avoid such exposure. 
In Schempp, the claimants’ natural circumstance of public 
school attendance was such that the students were brought 
into personal exposure to the unwelcomed prayer and biblical 
devotions or forced to assume special burdens to avoid them. 
Th is sensible rule has developed to prevent standing by 
contrivance. Requiring “injury” so as to have standing to sue 
can easily be manufactured if all one has to do is travel several 
miles to the site of a religious symbol or other expression of the 
government’s and personally observe it on one occasion. Th us, 
it makes sense that a plaintiﬀ ’s status (e.g., student, legislator, 
local municipal citizen) must naturally bring him or her into 
personal contact with the oﬀ ending expression.
Buono’s ongoing claim is that he will suﬀ er an oﬀ ense 
cognizable under the Establishment Clause if he travels to 
observe the cross which he deems a church-state violation, or he 
is “forced to assume special burdens to avoid” being re-exposed 
to the church-state violation. However, Buono’s status does 
not naturally subject him to personal exposure to the cross. 
Buono’s request for injunctive relief means that he necessarily 
avers an ongoing violation of the Establishment Clause. But 
he is a retired employee of the National Park Service residing 
in Oregon. Buono’s visits to the Preserve are totally at his own 
free will. It is not as if Buono is currently employed by the Park 
Service and his job duties require that, from time to time, he 
travel Cima Road past Sunrise Rock. Buono’s path to standing 
is foreclosed by Valley Forge, as well as that Court’s reliance on 
Schempp and Doremus.
II. In Cases Raising “Unwanted Exposure” to 
Religious Expression Attributable to the 
Government, Reduced-Rigor Standing Has Been 
Permitted Only Where the Plaintiff ’s Status 
Naturally Results In Personal Exposure to the 
Unwanted Religious Expression
Th ere is a very close connection between “injury in fact” 
for purposes of standing and damages (or “harm”) as a necessary 
element of every claim under the Establishment Clause and for 
which plaintiﬀ  seeks a remedy. Indeed, they usually have been 
treated as one and the same by the Supreme Court. Th erefore, 
the standing question in this case puts at issue a crucial element 
for stating a claim under the Court’s modern Establishment 
Clause.
As with taxpayer standing (discussed Part III, infra), 
the Supreme Court’s “unwanted exposure” cases under the 
Establishment Clause have resulted in reduced-rigor rules with 
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respect to the “injury in fact” required for standing. However, 
this reduction in the rigor with which “injury” is assessed is 
a narrow exception15—same as it is with taxpayer standing.16 
Reduced rigor in the required “injury” has been permitted 
only in cases challenging religious symbols or other expression 
attributable to the government. And only then does the lesser 
“injury” suﬃ  ce where the plaintiﬀ ’s status naturally results 
in personal exposure to the unwanted religious expression, 
or the plaintiﬀ  is forced to assume a special burden to avoid 
re-exposure.
Th e Supreme Court’s cases of “unwanted exposure” to 
government religious speech are not great in number—just 
sixteen. Moreover, in nearly all of these cases—just three 
exceptions—the plaintiﬀ ’s standing was not challenged on 
appeal by the government and thus was not an issue argued by 
counsel and decided by the Court. Th is second line of cases, 
therefore, have less to teach us with respect to what the Court 
minimally requires to have the “injury in fact” required for 
standing to bring a case of “unwanted exposure” to religious 
speech by the government. In chronological order the cases 
are as follows:
1. McCollum v. Board of Education17 invalidated a local school 
district’s program allowing nearby churches to hold optional 
religion classes in public school classrooms during regular school 
hours. Th e plaintiﬀ  was a resident and taxpayer of the local 
school district, and “a parent whose child was then enrolled 
in the Champaign public schools.”18 Also relevant to plaintiﬀ ’s 
subjection to the program to have standing to challenge it, the 
Court said:
Th e operation of the State’s compulsory education system thus 
assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction 
carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law 
to go to school for secular education are released in part from 
their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious 
classes.19
Th e government’s challenge to plaintiﬀ ’s standing was rejected 
without analysis in a single sentence: “A second ground for 
the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to 
maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit. 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 443, 445, 464.”20 (Coleman 
addressed the jurisdiction of the Court to review actions by 
state legislators said to have ratiﬁ ed a proposed amendment 
to the federal Constitution.) Accordingly, we do not have an 
explanation by the Court with respect to what “injury in fact” 
is required to ﬁ le a case of “unwanted exposure” to religious 
expression by the government.   
2. Doremus v. Board of Education21 challenged teacher-led 
devotional Bible reading in New Jersey public schools. However, 
the Court did not reach the merits. Some plaintiﬀ s, claiming 
status as state taxpayers, were dismissed for lack of standing. 
And a parent of a student subjected to the religious exercise had 
sued, but his child had subsequently graduated and thus his 
claim was moot. Accordingly, the case is not an instance where 
the Court ruled on the “injury in fact,” required of a plaintiﬀ  
claiming “unwanted exposure” to religious speech attributable 
to the government. 
3. Engel v. Vitale22 was a challenge to a statewide program of 
daily classroom prayer in New York public schools. Th e plaintiﬀ s 
were “parents of ten pupils... insisting that use of this oﬃ  cial 
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religion, 
or religious practices of both themselves and their children.”23 
Th e government did not challenge the standing of the plaintiﬀ s. 
Th at is surprising because the objecting parents and their school-
age children could obtain an opt-out from the prayer exercise.24 
So once again the case did not present an instance where the 
Court determined the “injury in fact” required of a plaintiﬀ  
claiming “unwanted exposure” to religious speech attributable 
to the government.
Th e fact that the “observance on the part of the students 
is voluntary,” however, did not escape the Court’s notice.25 
Th e prayer being voluntary would make a diﬀ erence under the 
Free Exercise Clause, explained the Court, where coercion is 
an essential element of the prima facie claim. But with respect 
to the Establishment Clause, coercion or compulsory exposure 
to the prayer need not be shown.26 Th is is because the object 
of the modern Establishment Clause is to separate church and 
state so as to prevent injury to either or both, as opposed to 
being a rights-based claim with its object being to prohibit 
individual religious harm.27 In Part III, infra, it will be shown 
how this relates to standing, and thus why the modern Court 
has fashioned “reduced rigor” standing rules only under the 
Establishment Clause. 
4. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp28 involved 
consolidated cases from Philadelphia and Baltimore, both 
challenging daily classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading 
in public schools. In both instances, the religious exercises were 
optional.29 In the Philadelphia case, the plaintiﬀ s were:
Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, 
Roger and Donna… members of the Unitarian Church in 
Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they... regularly 
attend religious services.... The [two] children attend the 
Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated 
by appellant district.30
Also, “Edward Schempp and the children testiﬁ ed as to speciﬁ c 
religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible 
‘which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held 
and to their familial teaching.’”31  
In the Baltimore case, the plaintiﬀ s were “Mrs. Madalyn 
Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, ... both professed 
atheists.”32 Th e “petition particularized the petitioners’ atheistic 
beliefs and stated that the rule, as practiced, violated their rights 
‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium 
on belief as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of 
conscience to the rule of the majority....’”33  
Th e lack of plaintiﬀ s’ standing to challenge the religious 
practices under the Establishment Clause was raised as an issue 
by the government.34 Th e Court reasoned in footnote 9 that 
the plaintiﬀ s had standing as follows:
[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under 
the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free 
Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious 
freedom are infringed.... Th e parties here are school children and 
their parents, who are directly aﬀ ected by the laws and practices 
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against which their complaints are directed. Th ese interests surely 
suﬃ  ce to give the parties standing to complain.
Th us, standing under the modern Establishment Clause is not 
only diﬀ erent, but the need for “injury in fact” is of lesser rigor. 
Th at much is clear. Footnote 9 cites as authority McGowan, 
Engel, and Doremus, but as we have seen in none of those cases 
did the government challenge the plaintiﬀ s’ standing to bring 
an “unwanted exposure” claim. 
As in Engel, the Schempp Court explained its lack of 
concern that plaintiﬀ s did not prove they were victims of 
the government’s compulsion or coercion. Coercion is an 
element of a Free Exercise Clause claim which is rights-based, 
but compulsion is not required to state a claim under the 
Establishment Clause.35 Th is is because the Establishment 
Clause is about policing the boundary between church and 
state. “[T]he Court found that the ‘ﬁ rst and most immediate 
purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a 
union of government and religion tends to destroy government 
and to degrade religion.’”36 In Part III, infra, it will be shown 
how this relates to standing, and thus why the modern Court 
has fashioned “reduced rigor” standing rules only under the 
Establishment Clause.
5. Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction,37 
citing Schempp, summarily struck down prayer and devotional 
Bible reading in the Dade County, Florida public school district. 
Th e plaintiﬀ s were parents of school-aged children enrolled in 
junior high and elementary schools in Dade County.38 Th e 
plaintiﬀ s’ standing to raise an “unwanted exposure” claim was 
not challenged by the government in the Supreme Court, and 
thus we have no guidance on the needed “injury” from the 
Court.
6. Stone v. Graham39 struck down a state law requiring the 
posting of the Ten Commandments in all public school 
classrooms. Plaintiﬀ s described themselves “as a Quaker, a 
Unitarian, a non-believer, a mother of school age children and 
public school teacher, two children of compulsory school age 
attending public schools, a Jewish Rabbi, and as taxpayers.”40 
Th e plaintiﬀ s’ standing to raise an “unwanted exposure” claim 
was not challenged by the government before the Supreme 
Court, and thus we have no guidance on the matter from the 
Court.
7. Marsh v. Chambers41 upheld a state legislative practice of hiring 
a chaplain to oﬀ er a prayer at the beginning of each day when 
the legislature is in session. Th e plaintiﬀ  was simply described 
as “a member of the Nebraska Legislature and a taxpayer of 
Nebraska.”42 Th e Court also noted that the plaintiﬀ  “claiming 
injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily 
susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ or peer pressure.”43 
Although the government had challenged the plaintiﬀ ’s standing 
in the circuit court,44 it did not again press the issue before the 
Supreme Court.45 Although conceded by the state, the Supreme 
Court nevertheless volunteered the following: “[W]e agree that 
Chambers, as a member of the legislature and as a taxpayer 
whose taxes are used to fund the chaplaincy, has standing to 
assert the claim.”46 Th us a person vested with the status of a 
legislator who is regularly in the legislative chamber when the 
oﬀ ending prayer takes place is suﬃ  cient “injury in fact” to have 
standing in this “unwanted exposure” case.
8. Lynch v. Donnelly47 upheld a municipal practice of displaying 
a nativity scene of Mary, Joseph, and the Christ child as part 
of a larger Christmas holiday scene in a park. Th e display was 
located in a private park in the heart of the shopping district.48 
Th e plaintiﬀ s were described as Pawtucket, Rhode Island 
“residents and individual members of the Rhode Island aﬃ  liate 
of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the aﬃ  liate itself.”49 
Th e Court’s majority opinion does not discuss standing, thus 
it appears the government did not challenge plaintiﬀ s’ claimed 
“unwanted exposure” injury giving rise to standing. 
In a now famous concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor 
ﬁ rst stated her “endorsement or disapproval test.” Her test 
identiﬁ es an injury that is personal to certain plaintiﬀ s that 
the Establishment Clause is said to prevent, namely that the 
Establishment Clause “prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing 
in the political community.”50 Justice O’Connor goes on with 
what in her view is the nature of the “injury in fact”:
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which 
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give 
the institutions access to government or governmental powers 
not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster 
the creation of political constituencies deﬁ ned along religious 
lines. Th e second and more direct infringement is government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members 
of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.51
A violation of the endorsement test always results in a plaintiﬀ ’s 
“religious” injury because the test is contingent on “adherence 
[or nonadherence] to a religion.” This “endorsement or 
disapproval” test has possibilities for identifying the personal 
religious injury that naturally ﬂ ows from one’s status as local 
citizen when the church-state matter at issue is “unwanted 
exposure” to a government’s religious expression. But the injury 
must be religious, unlike that claimed by Buono. Th at said, it is 
not clear the extent to which a majority of the current Supreme 
Court embraces Justice O’Connor’s test. Th e endorsement test 
would limit “unwanted exposure” standing to instances where 
there is religious injury. Th at is contrary to most of the Court’s 
array of sixteen “unwanted exposure” cases collected here. 
Accordingly, there is no reason to limit “unwanted exposure” 
standing to instances of religious injury.
9. Wallace v. Jaﬀ ree52 struck down a state law requiring that 
public schools begin the day with a moment of silence by 
students for prayer or meditation. Th e law was found to have 
a religious purpose.53 Th e plaintiﬀ  challenging the law was a 
parent who sued on behalf of “three of his minor children; two 
of them were second-grade students and the third was then in 
kindergarten.”54 Plaintiﬀ ’s standing to challenge the state law 
was not raised by the government. So once again we do not have 
the beneﬁ t of the Court’s discussion of what minimal “injury” 
is required in an “unwanted exposure” claim.
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10.  Edwards v. Aguillard55 struck down a state law requiring 
public schools to teach creationism whenever evolution is 
taught. Th e law was found to have a religious purpose.56 Th e 
plaintiﬀ s challenging the law “included parents of children 
attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and 
religious leaders.”57 Th e Court went on to observe:
Families entrust public schools with the education of their 
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the 
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views 
that may conﬂ ict with the private beliefs of the student and his or 
her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and 
their attendance is involuntary. Th e State exerts great authority 
and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, 
and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models 
and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.58
Th us the “harm” to plaintiﬀ s’ school-age children was the 
natural consequences of their status as students in Louisiana 
schools.
Once again there was no challenge by the government 
before the Supreme Court to plaintiﬀ s’ standing to call into 
question the state law. So we can only infer the “injury” needed 
for standing in a case of “unwanted exposure” to government 
religious speech.
11. County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU59 involved 
challenges to two local governmental displays during the 
December holiday season. Th e Court struck down a nativity 
scene inside the county courthouse, and upheld an outdoor 
display of a Menorah, Christmas tree, and liberty banner at a 
diﬀ erent location jointly operated by the city and county. Th e 
plaintiﬀ s challenging both displays were “the Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local 
residents” of the city and county.60 Once again the government 
did not challenge the plaintiﬀ s’ standing before the Court.
12. Lee v. Weisman61 struck down the practice of inviting clergy 
to oﬀ er prayers at public school commencement ceremonies. 
Attendance at the ceremony was voluntary, and no penalty 
attached to a student who did not attend.62 Th e plaintiﬀ s 
challenging the practice were “Daniel Weisman, in his 
individual capacity as a Providence taxpayer and as [father] of 
Deborah,” a student now graduated from the middle school, and 
enrolled in the high school where a similar prayer arrangement 
was conducted at its commencement.63 Plaintiﬀ s’ standing was 
discussed. Th e Court said:
We ﬁ nd it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman’s taxpayer 
standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us. 
Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical High 
School in Providence and from the record it appears likely, if not 
certain, that an invocation and benediction will be conducted at 
her high school graduation.64
Once again the voluntary nature of the ceremony—hence lack 
of compulsion—did not make a diﬀ erence so long as the claim 
is brought under the Establishment Clause.
13. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe65 struck down 
a public school process whereby a student is elected by fellow 
students to oﬀ er words of inspiration (with prayer as a likely 
choice) over the loudspeaker system before high school football 
games. Th e plaintiﬀ s challenging the practice were “two sets of 
current or former students and their respective mothers. One 
family is Mormon and the other is Catholic.”66 Th e government 
did not challenge the standing of the plaintiﬀ s to bring their 
claim under the Establishment Clause.
14. Elk Grove Uniﬁ ed School District v. Newdow67 concerned 
a plaintiﬀ  who was denied standing to challenge the words 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school 
students, including his daughter, at the beginning of each school 
day. Although the pledge was optional, both the daughter and 
her mother, who held legal custody, wished to have the daughter 
recite the pledge. Standing was denied because the plaintiﬀ , 
although the student’s father, was a noncustodial parent having 
no say in the matter. Accordingly, Newdow does not discuss the 
“injury in fact” needed for standing by a plaintiﬀ  complaining 
of “unwanted exposure” to religious expression attributable to 
the government.    
15. Van Orden v. Perry68 upheld the constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments monument, one of several monuments on 
display on the grounds outside the State of Texas Capitol. Th e 
plaintiﬀ  challenging the monument was described as follows:
Th omas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of Austin. 
At one time he was a licensed lawyer, having graduated from 
Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden testiﬁ ed that, since 
1995, he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument 
during his frequent visits to the Capitol grounds. His visits are 
typically for the purpose of using the law library in the Supreme 
Court building, which is located just northwest of the Capitol 
building.
Forty years after the monument’s erection and six years after 
Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently, he 
sued….69
As one trained as a lawyer but without a law oﬃ  ce or library of 
his own, as well as a citizen of Austin, it was natural that he took 
advantage of the free use of the law library near the Capitol. 
Th e government did not challenge Van Orden’s standing before 
the Court. 
16. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky70 struck down the 
Ten Commandments placed in display cases, along with other 
historical documents, in two county courthouses in the State 
of Kentucky. Th e plaintiﬀ s challenging both displays were 
all too brieﬂ y described as “American Civil Liberties Union 
of Kentucky, et al.”71 Th e Court also explained that in both 
counties “the hallway display was ‘readily visible to... county 
citizens who use the courthouse to conduct their civic business, 
to obtain or renew driver’s licenses and permits, to register 
cars, to local taxes, and to register to vote.’”72 A lower court 
opinion explains that in addition to the ACLU of Kentucky, 
the plaintiﬀ s were Lawrence Durham and Paul Lee.73 From the 
context it is apparent that Durham and Lee are residents of the 
county. Th e lower court said the ACLU had organizational 
standing because it “has members in Pulaski County who 
would have standing for the same reason that the named 
plaintiﬀ s have standing.”74 And the government suggested in 
its briefs that “the Ten Commandments were posted in order 
to teach Pulaski County residents about American religious 
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history and the foundations of the modern state.”75 Although 
before the district court the government challenged plaintiﬀ s’ 
standing because they lacked the necessary “injury in fact,”76 
having lost the issue at the trial level the government did not 
raise the standing question before the Supreme Court. One can 
infer from McCreary County that a county citizen who has to 
visit the site of the oﬀ ending religious message in order to do 
necessary legal transactions with the county government has the 
status and personal “unwanted exposure” so as to have “injury 
in fact” for purposes of standing. 
It is remarkable that in only three out of sixteen cases has plaintiﬀ s’ standing been challenged before the U.S. Supreme 
Court on the basis that there was no “injury in fact” due to 
“unwanted exposure” to the government’s religious speech. Th e 
three cases are Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman. Th ese three cases 
involve plaintiﬀ s who are parents and their school-age children, 
and a legislator. Th e rule to draw from Schempp, Marsh, and 
Weisman, and to a lesser degree the other thirteen cases where 
lack of standing might have been raised but was not, is that the 
“injury” required in an “unwanted exposure” case is that the 
oﬀ ended plaintiﬀ ’s status in life must have brought him or her 
into personal contact with the government’s religious symbol or 
other expression.77 Following this rule will prevent parties who 
would contrive their exposure “injury” by going out of their way 
to travel to the site of a religious symbol and observe it merely 
to acquire standing. Buono has no such status such that he has 
“injury in fact” endowing him with a “case” or “controversy” 
for which he has standing to sue.
III. Why the Court Has Permitted Reduced-
Rigor Standing in Only Two Instances, 
Both Involving Claims
 under the Establishment Clause 
In circumstances very diﬀ erent than the one before the 
Supreme Court, a claimant under the Establishment Clause can 
have individualized “injury in fact” that meets all of the normal 
requirements for standing. Th ese harms run from economic 
loss, to inability to qualify for public oﬃ  ce, to restrictions on 
academic inquiry.78 But in each of the six cases set out in the 
footnote, plaintiﬀ s had conventional “injury in fact” and thus 
met the usual “case” or “controversy” requirements for standing. 
Th at is not so with respect to cases involving “unwanted 
exposure” to religious symbols or other speech fairly attributable 
to the government. Only in two types of cases—taxpayer and 
“unwanted exposure” claims—has the Court applied a reduced-
rigor test for “injury in fact” so as to ease the path to reaching 
the merits of a claim under the Establishment Clause. Why 
is that so?
Th e Court’s modern view of the Establishment Clause 
was instituted sixty-two years ago with its decision in Everson 
v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing.79 Because both 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are pro-religious 
freedom,80 the question arose early with respect to how the 
two Clauses were to be distinguished. Th e Court’s answer 
came soon in Engel v. Vitale81 and was reaﬃ  rmed a year later 
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.82 As the 
Engel Court said:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they 
forbid two quite diﬀ erent kinds of governmental encroachment 
upon religious freedom. Th e Establishment Clause, unlike the 
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of 
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment 
of laws which establish any oﬃ  cial religion whether those laws 
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.83
Th e Court goes on to explain that the reason that coercion is 
not a required element of a no-establishment claim is that the 
Clause is ﬁ rst and foremost about the separation of church and 
state.84 Church-state separation is a relationship between two 
centers of authority. Th is is not due to any hostility to religion 
but for the protection of both the freedom of the church and 
to prevent division within the body politic when government 
takes sides on explicitly religious questions. Disestablishment 
deregulated religion, thus protecting both church and state. 
Individual liberties are protected by the Establishment Clause 
only as a consequence of keeping these two authorities in right 
order relative to each other, and sometimes the individual 
liberties protected are not religious, e.g., economic liberty, access 
to public oﬃ  ce, freedom of academic inquiry, etc.85
It thus developed in the Supreme Court that the Free 
Exercise Clause was conﬁ ned to addressing those situations 
where religious practice or observance had come under state 
coercion. Without evidence of coercion, either standing was 
denied (consider the discussion in Part II, supra, in Engel and 
Schempp) or the free exercise claim failed on the merits.86 Th e 
Free Exercise Clause is thus a rights-based claim; it runs in favor 
of religious individuals and faith groups they form.87
Th e Establishment Clause operates quite diﬀ erently—all 
the while retaining its character as pro-religious freedom. Th e 
Establishment Clause works to limit the power of government. 
In that sense, it operates much like a structural clause.88 Many 
an individual claimant need not show personal religious harm 
to win a claim under the Establishment Clause.89 Indeed, in two 
lines of cases the claimant does not need to show personalized 
injury at all—taxpayer and “unwanted exposure” cases. Th is 
came about because—unlike free exercise which is rights-
based—the Court’s modern Establishment Clause is about 
separation of church and state. When church and state are 
not rightly ordered, the harm or damage might be other than 
religious. As this Court said in McGowan v. Maryland:90
If the purpose of the “establishment” clause was only to insure 
protection for the “free exercise” of religion, then what we have 
said above concerning appellants’ standing to raise the “free 
exercise” contention would appear to be true here. However, the 
writing of Madison, who was the First Amendment’s architect, 
demonstrate that the establishment of a religion was equally feared 
because of its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of 
civil authority.91
Such oppression often resulted in injury other than religious 
harm (McGowan was economic), indeed it can result in 
instances where no one has individualized injury and hence 
no one has conventional standing to sue. Th is is called a 
“generalized grievance.”92
In this regard, the modern Supreme Court’s work via 
the Establishment Clause to keep rightly ordered church and 
state causes the no-establishment principle to operate in many 
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respects like the structural clauses of the Constitution which 
separate the powers of the three federal branches. And just as 
some violations of separation of powers can occur with no one 
personally harmed, a “generalized grievance” can and does occur 
where there is a colorable violation of the modern Establishment 
Clause but no one with individualized harm. Th e ﬁ rst such case 
appeared before the Court in Flast v. Cohen,93 and the Court 
responded by permitting limited federal taxpayer standing. 
Stated diﬀ erently, the surrogate of taxpayer as plaintiﬀ  with 
“injury in fact” permitted the Court to reach the merits of some 
no-establishment claims that would otherwise be nonjusticiable 
because no one had individuated injury to acquire standing.94
But as the plurality in Hein v. Freedom From Religion 
Foundation, Inc.,95 recently said, Flast inadequately 
acknowledged—even when limited as it was to claims under 
the Establishment Clause—the distortion wrought to the 
doctrine of separation of powers.96 So Flast, while still good 
law, has not been expanded.
Flast is not the only line of cases where the modern Court 
reduced the normal rigor of standing when it comes to the 
Establishment Clause. Th e other line is where plaintiﬀ s claim 
injury due to “unwanted exposure” to religious speech but who 
did not suﬀ er the coercion or compulsion that would normally 
be associated with the individualized injury required for 
standing. Early on, as we saw in Part II, supra, the most common 
case was public school students exposed to religion classes, 
prayer, and biblical devotions, but the exercise was optional. Th e 
Court’s response was to reduce the rigor of the required “injury 
in fact” by stating that coercion was not an element of a claim 
under the Establishment Clause. Like Flast, this necessarily 
required a trade oﬀ . With respect to the Court’s co-ordinate 
branches, reducing the rigor of standing was at the expense 
of the doctrine of separation of powers. With respect to the 
States, reduced rigor standing was at the expense of federalism. 
In either instance, reducing the “injury” needed for standing 
permitted the Court to reach the merits of an Establishment 
Clause claim that would otherwise be outside the Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction. Like Flast, however, the reduction in the 
rigor of normal standing requirements was narrow: only where 
the oﬀ ended plaintiﬀ ’s status naturally caused him or her to 
personally come into “unwanted exposure” to the government’s 
religious expression was standing permitted. 
Buono’s status does not fit within the limits of the 
Supreme Court’s narrow exception with respect to its “unwanted 
exposure” cases. He has no responsibilities as a local citizen, such 
as in McCreary County, to frequent the site at Sunrise Rock. 
He holds no status as a student or student’s parent, such as in 
McCollum or Schempp, which results in his presence at the site 
of the Latin cross, nor is he a legislator needing to be present 
in chambers to do his job as in Marsh. Assuming Buono has 
paid the admission fee to enter the Mojave National Preserve, 
certainly he has a legal right to be present at Sunrise Rock. But 
his presence is entirely by his free and unrestrained choice. 
Such a circumstance is no diﬀ erent than a citizen of India, 
who as a resident alien with a ﬁ ve-year visa to reside and work 
in Massachusetts, takes a vacation to Southeast California 
and pays the admission fee to enter the Mojave Preserve and 
happens to spot the Latin cross out of the windshield of his 
automobile as he drives by Sunrise Rock. Th is is one of those 
instances where if Buono has Article III standing to sue, then 
the entire population of people within the jurisdiction of the 
United States has standing to sue upon a single automobile ride 
along Cima Road. None of the Court’s sixteen cases set out in 
Part II, supra, is nearly so expansive.
CONCLUSION
Th e Supreme Court will have to expand its law with 
respect to “unwanted exposure” cases to ﬁ nd Frank Buono has 
standing to sue. Just the opposite inclination was demonstrated 
by the Roberts Court in Hein, and there is no obvious reason 
that has changed. Hein reaﬃ  rmed federal taxpayer standing, 
as originally announced in Flast, when the no-establishment 
principle was at risk because of congressional appropriation 
legislation. Th e plurality in Hein was right to do so. At the 
same time the Hein plurality was correct to not expand taxpayer 
standing into the myriad of discretionary decisions by oﬃ  cials 
in the Executive Branch. Flast represented a tolerably small 
compromise to separation of powers, in return for the Supreme 
Court taking its rightful role as a co-equal branch with Congress 
in the duty to police the boundary between church and state. 
Th e plaintiﬀ s in Hein, on the other hand, were asking for the 
Court to toss overboard the doctrine of separation of powers.97 
Frank Buono’s assertion of standing in this “unwanted exposure” 
case is far more like the plaintiﬀ s in Hein than in Flast.    
Further, should the Supreme Court dismiss Frank Buono’s 
complaint for lack of standing there will be no need to resolve 
the merits of Buono’s diﬃ  cult no-establishment claim involving 
prickly issues of congressional motive.98 Generally the Court 
would welcome the opportunity to not extend itself and resolve 
a diﬃ  cult constitutional question on the merits when the matter 
can so sensibly be disposed of on jurisdictional grounds.
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